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A.

FARBER*

On April 26, 1968, Paul Cohen was arrested for displaying the slogan "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket. Three years later, the United
States Supreme Court reversed his conviction.' Justice Harlan's majority opinion attracted little attention at the time. 2 Perhaps, as Justice
Harlan himself noted, the case seemed "at first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our books."' 3 Yet Cohen v. California did not

escape notice entirely, for it struck the discerning eye of Professor
and remarkably gallant, contribution to
Harry Kalven "as a helpful,
'4
theory."
first amendment
Today, Cohen v. Calfornia is widely recognized as an important

first amendment case.5 It is commonly considered the leading statement on the validity of prohibitions designed to protect people from

involuntary exposure to offensive speech. 6 Cohen is generally thought

to resolve this "captive audience" issue by placing the burden upon the
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Uni-

versity of Illinois.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Appendix, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (this appendix does not appear in the case
reporters, but may be found on microfiche at MICROCARD EDITIONS, INC., U.S. SUPREME COURT
RECORDS, BRIEFS (1970 OP), No. 299 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Appendix];
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 1975 [hereinafter cited as MORALITY OF CONSENT];
Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974
SuP. CT. REv. 281 [hereinafter cited as Arkes].
1. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
2. For example, it was not featured in the HarvardLawReview's survey of the term's most
important cases. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1971).
3. 403 U.S. at 15.
4. Kalven, Foreward-Even When a Nation is at War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 10 (1971). See
also Gunther, In Search of JudicialQuality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006-08 (1972).
5. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
792-93 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578, 618-19, 666 (1978).
6. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 677 & nn. 11 & 13; Black, He Cannot Choose But
Hear. The Plightof the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy. Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972).
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offended person to look away, at least when he is outside his own

7
home. Only when avoidance is impossible may the state intervene. If

this reading of Cohen is correct, then the decision is highly relevant to
cases like FCC v. Pac4'caFoundation,8 which involved a ban on "inde-

cent" broadcasting to protect people who might unwittingly turn on
their radios and be shocked by the language. 9 After all, it is argued,

turning off the radio would be no more of a burden than looking away
from an offensive jacket.' 0
One of the primary purposes of this Essay is to refute the notion
that Cohen resolved the captive audience problem. I will argue, to the
contrary, that the structure of Harlan's opinion shows that Cohen is

largely irrelevant to this issue. Instead, Harlan's real concern was
whether the state had the power to maintain a tolerable climate of

thought by purifying public discourse. For Harlan, the question was
not frivolous. He had previously been willing to grant the states broad
authority in regulating obscenity, in order to protect the moral fabric of
society from the effects of "degrading" speech.I' Yet in Cohen, he ultimately concluded that to extend the state's role as moral guardian to

areas beyond obscenity was incompatible with first amendment values.
So understood, Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen contrasts strikingly with the views of another great conservative thinker, Professor
Alexander Bickel. In his last book, The Morality of Consent, Bickel

argued that certain kinds of speech-pornography,

2 "filthy

and violent

7. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320-21 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 1973); Cinecom
Theaters Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1302-03, (7th Cir. 1973);
Arkes 313-14, 317 n.98; Haiman, supra note 6, at 171-72; 18 Loy. L. REV. 403, 409 (1972); cf.
Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REv. 1, 22 (1974) (in Cohen, the "Court failed to mention the 'sensibilities' interest, instead
referring to 'public morality,' a broader and less definable category"). See also the sources cited in
note 10 infra.
8. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9. Id. at 731-32, 748-50.
10. For arguments that Pacfcais controlled by Cohen, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 764-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 17
(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 66 n.51 (Supp. 1979);
Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: FirstAmendment Princoilesand Social Science Theory,
64 VA. L. REV.1123, 1229-30 (1978); Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words," the First
Amendment and the BroadcastMedia, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 164, 170-71 (1978); Comment, "Indecent" Language: A New Classof ProhibitableSpeech? FCCv. PaqfcaFoundation, 13 U. RIcH. L.
REV. 297, 305-07 (1979); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating
Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. RE. 579, 619 (1975); 12 AKRON L. REV. 284, 287 (1978); 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 155, 177 (1979); 53 TUL. L. REV. 273, 281 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456-58 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 500-03 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
12. MORALITY OF CONSENT 73-74.
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rhetoric," 13 and "a kind of cursing, assaultive speech that amounts to
almost physical aggression" 4-erode

fundamental social values,

thereby creating a climate in which actions otherwise unthinkable become realistic possibilities. He viewed these kinds of speech as a form

of pollution of our common moral environment.15 While aware of the
risks, he believed that government should take cautious steps toward
dealing with assaultive speech.16
Bickel's theory is somewhat removed from current first amendment doctrine, although perhaps less so than when he first wrote.' 7 Yet

the concerns he voiced are troubling and deserve attention, not only
because existing doctrine is subject to change, but also because as citi-

zens, if not as lawyers, we cannot limit our vision strictly to legal doctrine.
This Essay is intended as an exploration of these contrasting views

on control of offensive speech. It begins with a close examination of

Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen,'8 demonstrating that Harlan was

concerned with government power to upgrade public discourse, rather
than with offense to the immediate audience. As a result, Cohen, al-

though not wholly irrelevant, has little to say for cases such as Pacjca.
The second part of this Essay discusses two recent, related cases that

highlight the conffict between Justice Harlan and Professor Bickel and
13. Id. 73.
14. Bickel viewed Cohen as an example of such speech:
There is such a thing as verbal violence, a kind of cursing, assaultive speech that
amounts to almost physical aggression, bullying that is no less punishing because it is
simulated. Thus there is a difference, although in a 1971 decision the Supreme Court
managed not to perceive it, between carrying a sign in public that says, Down with the
Draft, and a sign that says-I bowdlerize-Fornicate the Draft; between a publication
that vigorously criticizes the police and one that depicts them in a cartoon as raping the
Statue of Liberty; between using all manner of epithets and employing a fashionable one
which is quaintly abbreviated, "mother." This sort of speech constitutes an assault.
More, and equally important, it may create a climate, an environment in which conduct
and actions that were not possible before become possible.
Id. 72 (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. 74.
16. Id. 75-76.
17. Bickel's views on obscenity were quoted with approval in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973). Interestingly enough, the Adult Theatre Court then cited, also with apparent approval, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), as support for the view that "there is a
'" 413 U.S. at 59-60
'right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society ....
(quoting Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)). In Beauharnais,the Court held that speech defaming a racial group could be made criminal. 343 U.S. at
261. Beauharnaisalso provided one of Bickel's examples of speech that society should be able to
control. MORALITY OF CONSENT 70. See text accompanying notes 100-11 infra for further discussion of the Beauharnalsproblem.
18. Quite apart from its relevance to my topic, this investigation is of interest for the light it
sheds on Harlan's extraordinary judicial technique. Only on close reading is Harlan's great craftsmanship apparent.
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examines both men's views in greater depth. Finally, after considering
the arguments for tolerating some forms of speech despite their offensiveness, this Essay suggests that offensiveness itself unwittingly serves
a useful role in our society.
I.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE COHEN OPINION

The genesis of Cohen v.California was an antiwar meeting attended by nineteen-year-old Paul Cohen. Someone else at the meeting
inscribed a peace symbol and the phrases "Stop War" and "Fuck the
Draft" on his jacket. Although he was not the inscriber, Cohen admittedly was aware of these insignia. 19 On April 26, 1968, he went to the
Los Angeles County courthouse to testify in a case that apparently had
no relation to the draft or the Vietnam War.20 When Cohen entered
the courtroom, he took off his jacket and stood with it folded over his
arm. In the meantime, a vigilant policeman had observed the jacket 2 '
and had sent the judge a note suggesting that Cohen be held in contempt of court. 22 Evidently, the policeman's theory was either that
wearing the jacket in the hall was an act of contempt, or that having it
folded over one's arm in the presence of a judge was contumacious
behavior. In any event, the judge wisely declined the policeman's invitation to forge new paths in the law of contempt.2 3 Thus deprived of
judicial reinforcement, the officer waited until Cohen left the courtroom and then arrested him for disturbing the peace.
California's disturbing the peace statute did not easily yield a
charge against Cohen. It did prohibit the use of "vulgar, profane, or
indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children" 24-so far, so good-but unfortunately this part of the statute ap19. Appendix 19.
in 70 P.
20. Transcript of Oral Agrument, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), repr
KURLAND & G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828, 830, 845 (1975).
21. It seems vigilance was required. According to Cohen's ACLU counsel, Professor Melville Nimmer of the UCLA Law School, the jacket was covered with writing and the words "Fuck
the Draft" did not really stand out. Telephone interview with Professor Melville Nimmer, ULCA
Law School (Aug. 10, 1979).
22. 403 U.S. at 19 n.3.
23. In Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974), the petitioner used the word "chickenshit" in answering a question on cross-examination, and was cited for contempt. The Supreme
Court held that "[tihis single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any
officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt." rd. at
698. The Court further stated that to support a contempt charge, the language must constitute an
imminent threat to the administration of justice. Id. California contempt law appears to be in
harmony with these views. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West Supp. 1979); 14 CAL. JUR.
Contempt § 11 (1974).
24. The statute, section 415 of the California Penal Code, provided:
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plied solely to language used in a "loud and boisterous manner. '2 5 The
only other potentially applicable provision was the general prohibition

against "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person ... by ... offensive conduct. '26 The trial
judge found this language a sufficient basis for conviction and imposed

a sentence of thirty days in jail.27 This harsh sentence, for what was at
most a juvenile prank, 28 is hard to understand except as the conse-

quence of either a puritanical attitude toward Cohen's language or,
worse, strong hostility to Cohen's political views.
Cohen appealed the conviction to the Appellate Department of the

Superior Court, which reversed in a brief memorandum order, stating
simply that "conduct that is merely offensive is insufficient" to support
a conviction under the statute.29 In response to the state's petition for
rehearing, the Appellate Department issued a much lengthier opinion. 30 Again relying on a statutory ground, the court concluded that
conduct must be not only "offensive," but also "tumultuous," 31 and
32
that Cohen's conduct did not qualify as tumultuous.

The state then appealed the case to the California Court of Appeal, which held that the statute did cover Cohen's conduct. 33 The ap-

pellate court construed the statute to apply when a person's willful
conduct foreseeably provokes others to engage in violence or breach
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on the public
streets of any unincorporated town, or upon the public highways in such unincorporated
town, run any horse race, either for a wager or amusement, or fire any gun or pistol in
such unincorporated town, or use any vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the
presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction by any Court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail
for not more than ninety days, or by both fine and imprisonment, or either, at the discretion of the Court.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 403 U.S. at 16.
28. Even the Cohen dissenters called the conduct merely an "absurd and immature antic."
Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. Appendix 10-11.
30. Id. 13.
31. Id. 14.
32. Id. 13-17. The state contended that because the statute was written in the disjunctive,
conduct that was merely "offensive" was enough to convict. The court disagreed, noting that each
of the specific acts listed under section 415 that constituted contempt contained elements of noise,
disturbance, or conflict. The court inferred that the statute did not encompass peaceable conduct
even if it was offensive. The court therefore concluded that to come under the statute conduct
must have elements of noise, disturbance, or conflict, and that section 415 required the conduct to
be both "offensive" and "tumultuous." Id. 16.
33. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969).
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the peace. 34 In the court's view, Cohen was guilty under this test: he

had "carefully chose[n] the forum for his views where his conduct
would have an effective shock value. '35 Accordingly, the appellate

court concluded, he should have known that others might assault him
or forcibly remove his jacket to protect women and children from expo36
sure to his "lewd and vulgar language."

Cohen's attempt to obtain review in the California Supreme Court
was unsuccessful. 37 He did have the satisfaction, however, of receiving

dissenting votes from Chief Justice Traynor and Justices Peters and Tobriner. 38 The stage was set for his appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.
On June 22, 1970, the Court agreed to hear the case, postponing
consideration of whether it had jurisdiction. 39 The parties presented

oral argument in February of 1971, and the Court announced its decision on June 7, 1971.40 Splitting five to four, the Court reversed the
conviction, with Justice Harlan writing for the majority and Justice
4
Black joining the dissent. '

34. Id. at 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506. There is an odd element of circularity in this definition:
disturbing the peace includes provoking others to disturb the peace. Apparently, a person could
disturb the peace by engaging in peaceful conduct that provoked others to engage in peaceful
conduct that provoked still others to commit violence. In theory, the head of the selective service
system could be found guilty of disturbing the peace because he willfully and foreseeably provoked Cohen into disturbing the peace. The extraordinary scope of this definition may make it
susceptible to vagueness and overbreadth attacks.
The California Supreme Court later had occasion to interpret section 415 in In re Bushman, I
Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970). In dissent in Cohen, Justice Blackman asserted that the case should have been remanded to the California Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Bushman. 403 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the Bushman
opinion uses language similar to that used by the Court of Appeal in People v. Cohen, and even
cites the lower court case approvingly. In re Bushman, I Cal. 3d at 773, 463 P.2d at 730, 83 Cal.
Rptr. at 378 (conduct "likely to" incite others to violence may be "offensive conduct" and thus a
disturbance of the peace). See 403 U.S. at 17 n.2. Furthermore, there is the possibility that even
on remand the California Court of Appeal would have reached the same decision, merely delaying the ultimate disposition of the case.
35. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506. See also id. at 103, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 509
(gravamen of offense was defendant's "selection of the public corridors of the county courthouse
as the place to parade before women and children").
36. Id. at 103, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
37. 1 Cal. App. 3d 104, 81 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1969).
38. Id.
39. 399 U.S. 904 (1970). The jurisdictional issue turned out to be trivial. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 17-18.
40. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
41. Thus, the majority opinion was written by the Court's foremost advocate of balancing in
first amendment cases, while the dissent was joined by the foremost advocate of "absolute" protection for speech. See generally Kalven, Upon RereadingMr. Justice Black on the FirstAmendment,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428, 447-53 (1967). It is tempting to excuse Black's vote on the basis of age
and illness, since he died shortly thereafter. If these factors excuse Black's vote, they make
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Had he not been troubled by the case, Justice Harlan could have
disposed of it with little elaboration. The record contained no indication of a violent reaction, actual or threatened, to Cohen's conduct, as
required by the lower court's construction 42 of the statute.43 Hence, the
California court had necessarily relied on the questionable presumption that offensive speech is likely to cause a violent reaction. Justice
Harlan took only a single paragraph to expose the unconstitutionality
of this presumption. Surely, he argued, there cannot be a great many
people who would resort to violence at the sight of a four-letter word,
and the possible existence of a few persons this easily provoked to violence is not a sufficient justification for a restriction on speech. If it
were, anyone who voiced an unpopular viewpoint would face arrest.
With this line of reasoning, Justice Harlan dismissed the rationale of
the lower court as "plainly untenable." 44
Justice Harlan was not always averse to disposing of cases on the
narrowest of grounds. 4 5 He could have done so in Cohen, based solely
on the failure of the statute (as construed to cover only conduct likely
to cause a violent reaction) to reach Cohen's conduct without the aid of
an unconstitutional presumption. 46 An opinion resting entirely on this
Harlan's opinion all the more "remarkably gallant," in Harry Kalven's phrase, since Harlan was
also mortally ill. See generally H. BLACK, My FATHER: A REMEMBERANCE 247-66 (1975).
42. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
43. Indeed, counsel for the state conceded that there was nothing in the record to show that
anyone had even been offended, let alone provoked to violence. See note 65 infra.
44. 403 U.S. at 23. Justice Harlan's formulation of this argument is, however, considerably
more eloquent:
The rationale of the California court is plainly untenable. At most it reflects an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). We have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen. There may be some persons
about with such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient base upon
which to erect, consistently with constitutional values, a governmental power to force
persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of
expression. The argument amounts to little more than the self-defeating proposition that
to avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a
hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate that censorship themselves.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In Street, the issue presented was
whether flag burning is protected by the first amendment. Id. at 595 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan managed to avoid this issue by unearthing an indication in the record that Street's
conviction might have been based in part on his utterances at the time. Based on this speculation,
Harlan reversed the conviction without reaching the fundamental issue. In fairness to Justice
Harlan, it should be added that his discussion of whether those utterances were protected was
insightful and a useful addition to first amendment jurisprudence. See Gunther, supra note 4, at
1008-11.
46. In a footnote, Justice Harlan admitted that there was "some force" to the argument that
no broader issue was properly before the Court. 403 U.S. at 23 n.5. He argued that it was "not

290
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narrow ground, however, would not have been intellectually satisfying.
The lower court's rationale was too patently meritless to be taken seriously. It can only be understood as a transparent attempt to provide
doctrinal support for the traditional taboo on public utterance of certain words. The crux of the case was the legal status of deep-seated
societal antipathy for certain four-letter words. 47 Harlan's evident desire to deal with this problem caused him to take a more circuitous
approach in resolving the matter.
The opinion begins with an analysis of "various matters which this
record does not present. '48 Of these, two issues are especially significant for our purposes. The first relates to the locale of the speech. The
California court had stressed Cohen's "selection of the public corridor
of the courthouse as the place to parade" 4 9 with his slogan. This appears to be the point of Justice Blackmun's dissent, which dismissed
Cohen's action as "mainly conduct and little speech." 50 This characterization makes little sense unless Blackmun thought Cohen was conducting a sort of protest march through the courthouse.5 ' Although
Justice Harlan probably was sympathetic to this claim of special respect
for courts and their environs,5 2 he nevertheless rejected it as a basis for
upholding the conviction because the statute contained no suggestion
of any special restriction on speech within the courthouse.5 3 Because of
this failure to provide fair notice, the Court held that the conviction
to
could not be supported on the ground that the statute attempted '54
"preserve an appropriately decorous atmosphere in the courthouse.
. . .inappropriate" to consider whether some broader rationale might support a per se ban on the
public use of certain words. Id. Nevertheless, he expressly refrained from deciding whether this
broader issue was properly presented on the record in Cohen. Id.

47. Perhaps this is an appropriate place to note that Justice Harlan's opinion directly challenged this societal attitude not only by defending the use of these words, id. at 23-24, but also by
using one of them in the statement of facts, id. at 16. A LEXIS search indicates that the Cohen
opinion contains the first appearance of the word "uck" or its derivatives in the United States

Reports.
48. 403 U.S. at 18.
49. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
50. 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. Actually, this appears not to have been Cohen's purpose. He was in the courthouse to
testify as a witness in an unrelated case, and wore the jacket because the weather was chilly. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, reprintedin 70 P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, supra note

20, at 828, 835.
52. See Lewin, Justice Harlan: The FullMeasure of the Man, 58 A.B.A.J. 579, 582 (1972);
Lumbard, John Harlan: In Public Service 1925-1971, 85 HARV. L. REv. 372, 376 (1971); Wood,
John M Harlan,AsSeen by a Colleague in the Practiceof Law, 85 HARv. L. REv. 377, 380 (1971).
53. See note 24 supra. Indeed, unlike the defendants in many cases in which similar appeals

to "fair notice" are made, Cohen actually might have been influenced had he received such notice.
After all, he did remove the jacket when he entered the courtroom.
54. 403 U.S. at 19.
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The Court's failure to rule on the abstract validity of strictures to assure
courthouse decorum leaves open the possibility, however, that a narrowly drawn ban on four-letter words within the courthouse would
55
have been acceptable.
The second issue specifically put aside by the Court is the "captive

audience" argument, inparticular, whether the government could legitimately act to prevent Cohen's offensive language from being thrust
upon unwilling viewers. The discussion began with a general exploration of the captive audience problem.5 6 Justice Harlan observed that
the recognized power of government to prevent intrusion into the sanc-

tuary of the home must be sharply limited elsewhere if it is not to become an instrument for majoritarian repression of dissidents. His
proposed test was that "substantial privacy interests" must be invaded
in an "essentially intolerable manner. ' 57 This test obviously leaves un-

specified which privacy interests have substance and which invasions
can be tolerated.5 8 Justice Harlan found the privacy interest in Cohen

far less substantial than the interest invaded by sound trucks blaring
into homes, 59 since people confronted with Cohen's jacket could simply
55. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 561-64 (1965) (Cox II) (upholding constitutionality of narrowly drawn statute forbidding picketing near courthouse, but reversing defendant's
conviction because no violation of statute occurred) with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544-52
(1965) (Cox 1) (reversing defendant's conviction for breach of peace on same facts and invalidating statute as unconstitutionally vague). For this reason, it is misleading to assert that Cohen held
that the act of wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor was
constitutionally protected. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 578. Since Cohen leaves open the
possibility that this act could have been punished under a properly drawn statute, the Court cannot properly be said to have held that the act was constitutionally protected.
56. 403 U.S. at 21.
57. Id.
58. See Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv.233, 263 (Cohen
test "facially ambiguous"). This test is similar to the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test set
forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz had been convicted of transmitting
wagering information by telephone in violation of federal law. At trial, the government was allowed to introduce evidence of Katz's portion of certain telephone conversations overheard by
FBI agents who had attached electronic listening devices to the outside of a telephone booth Katz
had used. The issue facing the Court was whether this eavesdropping was an unconstitutional
search and seizure. The Court answered in the affirmative, noting that the fourth amendment
"protects people, not places"; what one seeks to keep private, even in a telephone booth, may be
constitutionally protected. Id. at 351-52. It is Harlan's concurrence, however, that has been frequently used in interpreting Katz. See, e.g., I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 227 (1978).
Harlan viewed the Katz test as having two prongs: requiring first that the person have "an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's concurrence may
help define the limits of the Cohen test. By analogy from Katz to Cohen, perhaps one should
examine (a) contemporary expectations regarding what speech people will hear in particular
places or in the media, and (b) the extent to which courts should recognize these expectations as
reasonable.
59. 403 U.S. at 21 (referring to Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1948)).
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look away. On the other hand, the interest in privacy while walking
through the courthouse corridor was at least arguably more substantial
'60
than the interest in privacy while "strolling through Central Park.
Perhaps it is fair to infer that Harlan found the privacy claim in Cohen
less than compelling, but it is also clear that he did not find it frivolous.
His final decision was to avoid the issue:
Given the subtlety and complexity of the factors involved, if Cohen's
"speech" was otherwise entitled to constitutional protection, we do
not think the fact that some unwilling "listeners" in a public building
may have been briefly exposed to it can serve to justify this breach of
the peace conviction where, as here, there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid appellant's conduct did in fact object to it,
and where that portion of the statute upon which Cohen's conviction
rests evinces no concern, either on its face or as construed by the
California courts, with the special plight of the captive auditor, but,
instead, indiscriminately sweeps within its prohibitions 6all "offensive
conduct" that disturbs "any neighborhood or person." '
With these two issues placed to the side, Harlan found that the
case presented a single remaining issue: whether the state could completely outlaw the word "fuck," either on the theory that its use is inherently likely to provoke violence, or on the theory that the states,
"acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove this of' '62 As has been shown, 63
fensive word from the public vocabulary.
Harlan rejected the violence theory as unsupportable, leaving only the
second theory, which Harlan restated as an attempt to maintain "a suitable level of discourse within the body politic." 64 This theory represented state censorship in its purest form: it claimed state power to
censor offensive words, even when there was no objection 65 and no risk
of concrete harm. Not only would this censorship apply as fully to
60. 403 U.S. at 21-22.
61. Id. at 22. Because of Harlan's reference to the "subtlety and complexity of the factors
involved," it is difficult to predict what his response to captive audience claims would have been in
other situations, such as that in Pacfca.
62. Id. at 22-23.
63. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
64. 403 U.S. at 23. It should be clear at this point that this theory is quite different from a

captive audience rationale. Under the captive audience rationale, the state can arguably prevent
Ann from using the word "fuck" in a speech to her willing audience, Betty and Charley, in order
to protect the sensibilities of Dave, who is unwittingly walking by. Under the public morality
theory, the state can take the same action to "protect" Betty and Charley from hearing language
they are willing to hear, but which the state considers unsuitable. Because it directly interferes
with the relationship between a speaker and a willing audience, regulation based on the public
morality rationale is far more paternalistic and conflicts more directly with first amendment values. See generally Farber, CommercialSpeech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.

372, 404-05 (1979).
65. The importance of the fact that no one objected was brought into focus during oral argument:
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Lenny Bruce speaking to a willing nightclub audience 66 as it would to

Cohen, but presumably it would apply to literary works as well. Despite his willingness to grant the states similar power over erotic literature,67 Harlan was reluctant to expand the established exceptions to the
usual rule against content censorship. He concluded, for reasons that
will be discussed in connection with Professor Bickel's views,68 that
THE COURT: Well, what is there in the record-in testimony--that shows that these
words were offensive to any person in that building at that time?
MR. SAUER: There's nothing in the record, Mr. Justice Marshall. We just said "the
effect on the average person." As I go back and read Chaplinsky, there's no showing that
Major Browerlein, when the man yelled at him "You damn fascist," or "You damn
racketeer," was offended by the statement. There's no showing that Major Browerlein
was going to react against it.
THE COURT: Well, who in the building was interested in the draft? Does the record
show?
MR. SAUER: There's no showing. Even appellant admits the man was there because
just citizens who would be presentTHE COURT: Well, my great difficulty as to what's the difference between the man
whispering something in the corner to somebody, and wearing a jacket that so far as this
record shows only one person saw it?
MR. SAUER: No, I believe three people saw it. There was a S[e]rgeant Spawn. There
was someone named Alexander, and there was one other person, I believe, who saw it.
THE COURT: Well, was it offensive to them?
THE COURT: Mr. Sauer, may I read from the Settled Statement on appeal?
"S[e]rgeant Shauler and Officer Alexander corroborated Sfe]rgeant Spawn's testimony as
to defendant's presence in the corridor, his wearing of the jacket; his entering the courtroom; and as to the presence in the corridor of women and children." Isn't that the
answer?
MR. SAUER: Correct, Mr. Justice Blackmun, yes. I said the record shows that there
were other individuals present, as well as three specifically named individuals. There
were women and children present in the corridor.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, reprintedin 70 P. KURLAND & G. CASPER at 844-45.
This colloquy brings out three interesting points. First, the record does not show that anyone was
offended. Second, as far as the record shows, the only people who noticed the jacket were three
police officers. Third, at oral argument, at least one Justice was of the view that there was no
captive audience problem because the issue would have been the same if Cohen had been "whispering something in the corner to somebody." If the state is to regulate the use of offensive language in a whispered conversation, the state must have a reason other than a desire to prevent
offense to bystanders. Instead, the reason must be a desire to improve the morals of the participants, or something similar.
66. See generaly People v. Bruce, 31 Ill. 2d 459, 202 N.E.2d 497 (1964).
67. See cases cited in note 11 supra. In Cohen, Justice Harlan treated the obscenity cases as
involving a special but limited state power.
[T]his case cannot be said to fall within those relatively few categories of instances where
prior decisions have established the power of government to deal more comprehensively
with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a showing that such a form was
employed. This is not, for example, an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary
to give rise to the States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression
must be, in some significant way, erotic. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It
cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System
would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely defaced jacket.
403 U.S. at 19-20. Later in the opinion, Justice Harlan stressed that "most situations where the
State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within one or'more of the various
established exceptions. . . ." Id. at 24.
68. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
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government control over the public vocabulary was intolerable.6 9
It should be clear by now that Harlan's first amendment methodology did not revolve around the simple issue of constitutional protection 7o for particular conduct. Rather, Harlan first carefully determined
what justifications for regulation were properly before the Court and
then attempted to determine the sufficiency of those particular justifications. The result of this analysis has been misleading when carelessly
used as precedent in later cases. For example, in FCCv. Pacpfca Foundation,71 the issue was whether a radio station was entitled to play a
record containing a number of four-letter words. At first sight, Cohen
appears to be powerful precedent on this issue. On closer analysis,
however, Cohen proves to have little relevance. The Federal Communications Commission's justifications for regulating speech in Pacifica
turned on the context of the midafternoon broadcast, whereas Justice
Harlan found that none of the possible context-related justifications
were properly presented in Cohen. Instead, the issue he did find to be
properly presented-and therefore the only issue he decided-was
whether the state, acting as a paternalistic guardian of public morality,
could ban the use of certain words in all contexts. Because Pac#fca
dealt with context and Cohen dealt only with content, Cohen contrib72
utes little to the issue presented in Pacqfca.
69. From the point of view ofjudicial craftsmanship, this opinion is most admirable for the
precision with which Harlan isolated the essential issue in the case. His elimination of other
possible issues was based not only on a sure grasp of the relevant legal tools, see generally Gunther, supra note 4, at 1007 (Harlan's "dissection of state justifications" called "exemplary"), but
also on a sound instinct about the crux of the case. Recall that while the record revealed no
objections from bystanders in the hall, see note 65 supra, the police pursued Cohen into a courtroom, and even though he had removed the jacket they attempted to have him held in contempt of
court. It is hard to perceive this behavior as anything other than the officious intermeddling of
self-appointed guardians of public morality. Moreover, Cohen's counsel says that, as far as he
knows, the police did not ask Cohen to remove the jacket. Telephone interview with Professor
Melville Nimmer, UCLA Law School (Aug. 10, 1979). This reinforces the view that the police
were less interested in protecting bystanders than in punishing immoral speech.
70. Despite the reversal of Cohen's conviction, it still could not be said with any assurance
that his conduct was constitutionally immune from prohibiton. See note 55 supra.
71. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
72. The Court in Pacfca could not avoid the captive audience issue because Pac//ca involved an objecting bystander. 438 U.S. at 747 n.25. Thus, commentators who find the absence of
objection in Cohen an irrelevant difference between the two cases are incorrect. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 10, at 1230 n.639. The point is not that a single objection is enough
to create a strong captive audience claim; rather, the point is that it is difficult to find a captive
audience claim at all unless someone objects.
A case decided a year after Cohen reinforces the view that the Cohen Court did not reach the
merits of the context-related justifications for regulating speech. In Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972), the Court relied on Cohen in holding that an obscenity conviction could not be upheld
on the theory that a film was obscene when shown at a drive-in theatre but not when shown
indoors. The state had asserted that it had a special interest in "prohibiting outdoor displays of

Vol. 1980:283]

CIVILIZING PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Although Cohen does not resolve all the questions relating to offensive speech, it does answer one basic question: whether the goal of
maintaining a minimum quality of public discourse justifies restrictions
on offensive speech. Before accepting too readily Justice Harlan's negative answer to this question, however, it is well to consider opposing
arguments.
II.

THE DEBATE ON CIVILITY AND RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH

In the abstract, the balance between the values of free speech and
public civility is struck all too easily: free speech must prevail. When
confronted with speech that truly offends us, however, we begin to feel
the need for a less facile analysis. Cohen's speech is probably not sufficiently offensive to challenge our abstract views on civility and free
speech. His underlying message was well within the political mainstream. In retrospect, that message today probably arouses the sympathy even of many people whose political views differed at the time.
Moreover, Cohen's language has become considerably more acceptable
in what used to be called "polite society."
A much tougher test is posed by the facts of Village of Skokie v.
National Socialist Pary 73 and Collin v. Smith. 74 These cases arose
from the same circumstances: an attempt by the American Nazi Party
to conduct a march in the largely Jewish suburb of Skokie, Illinois.
Several thousand survivors of the Third Reich, and many others whose
relatives were murdered by the Nazis, live in Skokie. The American
Nazis intended to march through town wearing Nazi uniforms and displaying the swastika on armbands and flags. 75 As the Seventh Circuit
observed, we cannot
ignore the certainty that appellees [the Nazis] know full well that, in
light of their views and the historical associations they would bring
with them to Skokie, many people would find their demonstration
or the suspicion that
extremely mentally and emotionally disturbing,
76
such a result may be relished by appellees.
Although there was reason to fear violence, local officials declined to
stop the march on that basis. Instead, they commendably pledged to
sexually frank motion pictures." Id. at 316. The Court responded that the statute did not give
notice that the place where a film was shown was relevant. Consequently, just as the need to
maintain decorum near the courts could not be raised to uphold the Cohen conviction, neither
could the desire to shield outdoor displays be used to support the conviction in Rabe. See id.
73. 69 11. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
74. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).

75. For a full statement of the facts, see the Village of Skokie opinion, 69 Iln. 2d at 609-11,
373 N.E.2d at 21-23. Further background on the litigation can be found in Goldberger, Skokie:
The Firs.t Amendment Under Attack by its Friends,29 MERCER L. REV. 761 (1978).

76. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1200.
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77
make every effort to protect the Nazis if the march were held.
Moreoever, there was no captive audience problem. Since the Nazi
march was well publicized, anyone who would be offended could stay
away.78 The only remaining basis for cancelling the march or banning
the display of swastikas was that the mere existence of such activity was
an intolerable affront to our sense of civilized decency.
Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit were convinced that an affront to our
sense of decency did not justify prohibiting the Nazis' march or their
display of swastikas. The Seventh Circuit conceded that the Nazis' beliefs are repugnant to our "core values" and to "much of what we cherish in civilization." 79 Nevertheless, under the first amendment, "there
is no such thing as a false idea"; 80 even the Nazis are entitled to compete in the marketplace of ideas. The Illinois Supreme Court, while
admitting that the sight of swastikas is "abhorrent to the Jewish citizens
of Skokie 81t and that the memories evoked are "offensive to the principles of a free nation,"82 concluded with some reluctance that "it is entirely clear that this factor does not justify enjoining defendants'
84
speech. '83 Both courts, incidentally, cited Cohen extensively.
It is a tribute to both courts that they ruled as they did despite
obvious misgivings about the effects of their decisions. The Skokie
cases ought to provoke misgivings. We ought not lightly decide to subject survivors of concentration camps to the nightmare of storm troopers marching through the streets. As a society, must we tolerate speech
that so grievously offends the most basic values of our civilization?
Several years before Skokie, Professor Alexander Bickel presented
a forceful argument that we should not tolerate this kind of speech. 85
At some risk of oversimplification, his basic argument against tolerance
may be summarized as follows: the necessary premise of the first
amendment is that speech has important consequences. If we believed
that "words don't matter, that they make nothing happen and are too
77. Id. at 1203 n.10.

78. In any case, the march was to be held at the city hall on a Sunday afternoon, when few
people would normally be present. Id. at 1207.
79. Id. at 1200.
80. Id. at 1203 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
2d at 615, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
81. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The Collin opinion cites Cohen six times. 578 F.2d at 1201, 1202 (twice), 1204, 1206, 1207
n.18. The Village ofSkokie opinion quotes four paragraphs of the Cohen opinion at one point, 69
Ill. 2d at 613-15, 373 N.E.2d at 23-24, later quotes another paragraph, id. at 615-16, 373 N.E.2d at
24-25, and then cites Cohen again in its concluding paragraph, id. at 619, 373 N.E.2d at 26.
85. MORALITY OF CONSENT 70-71.

Vol. 1980:283]

CIVILIZING PUBLIC DISCO URSE

trivial to bother with," 86 then little reason would exist to refrain from
regulating speech that annoys the majority. Yet, if speech does matter,
speech like that of the Nazis must have the capacity for enormous
harm. Bickel then addressed and rejected the arguments made by Justices Brandeis and Holmes for tolerating potentially harmful speech.
Brandeis, with his usual faith in human nature, argued that further discussion "affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine .... *87 In other words, bad ideas will not
survive exposure to the marketplace of ideas. Holmes, with his usual
toughmindedness, purported not to care: "If in the long run [these]
beliefs . . . are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way." 88 Bickel rejected Brandeis' optimism. In Bickel's view, to assume that further discussion will necessarily lead to the rejection of false ideas was to ignore the lesson of
history that "[d]isastrously, unacceptably noxious doctrine can prevail."' 89 Nor did Bickel accept Holmes' purported indifference to the
final product of the marketplace. Bickel's belief in the marketplace of
ideas was not so strong that he was willing to accept the idea of genocide if enough people came to believe in it after full discussion. In his
view, ideas such as genocide are not entitled to a fair chance to gain
majority support.90 In short, Bickel was not willing to ignore the risk
that truly horrible ideas may triumph in the marketplace.
Bickel saw another harm in tolerating unacceptable speech: he
found in expressions such as "fuck the draft" a kind of verbal assault
on the audience. He believed also that abusive language creates a
moral climate in which antisocial conduct becomes more likely. 91 As in
the case of obscenity, he contended that "what is commonly read and
seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, wanted or not, for it
92
constitutes our environment."
To imply that Bickel's appeal was a simple plea for repression,
86. Id. 71.
87. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
88. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. MORALITY OF CONSENT 72. Professor Kurland apparently shares this view. See Goldberger, supra note 75, at 770 (quoting a speech by Kurland).
90. MORALITY OF CONSENT 72, 76-77. In a more recent article, Dean Wellington supported
Bickel's view: "Most of us do believe that the book is closed on some issues. Genocide is an
example." Wellington, On Freedom ofExpression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1132 (1979).
91. MORALITY OF CONSENT 72-73. "Where nothing is unspeakable, nothing is undoable."
Id.
92. Id. 74. For the Supreme Court's response to this argument in the obscenity area, see
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973). See note 17 supra.
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however, would be to misrepresent his views. As always, tension and
ambiguity characterized his thoughts. He was keenly aware of the risks
created by even the most limited grant of the power of censorship. As a

consequence, he sought a workable accommodation rather than a clear
resolution of conflicting values. Although his ultimate conclusions
were not entirely clear, he seemed inclined toward the following position.93 First, he believed that we need to "resist the assertion of abso-

lute claims."' 94 In particular, we should not acknowledge a positive
95
right to engage in offensive speech, for to do so is to legitimize it.
Second, we should control the risks created by restrictive laws through
devices like the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. 96 Third, the very

existence of restrictive laws, and "occasional but steady enforcement in
aggravated cases," serve the important purpose of providing visible
support for our basic social values.97 In sum, Bickel believed that in
98
regulating this area, the law "walks a tightrope, and runs high risks,"
but that the effort is worth it, "[flor the stakes are high." 99

A thoughtful article by Professor Hadley Arkes develops a similar
argument inthe specific context of racial defamation.' 00 Echoing arguments by Justice Frankfurter'0 ' and David Riesman, 0 2 Arkes contends
93. I am extrapolating in part from Bickel's conclusions on obscenity, which he viewed as
presenting essentially the same issue. Perhaps some of the lack of clarity was due to the evolving
nature of his analysis at the time of his death.
94. MORALITY OF CONSENT 88.

95. Id. 73.
96. Id. 78-79. See also id. 87-88.
97. Id. 75.
98. Id.
99. Id. 75-76.
100. Arkes.
101. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The present status of Beauharnaisis
unclear. The opinion has been harshly critized, see, e.g., H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 1-64 (1965), and some lower courts doubt that it remains good law. See, e.g., Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 916 (1978); Tollett v. United States,
485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403
F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J.,
concurring), cert. denied,394 U.S. 930 (1969). On
the other hand, Beauharnaiswas cited with apparent approval in ParisAdult Theatre. See note 17
supra. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Collin v. Smith, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), leaves the
status of Beauharnaishighly uncertain.
102. Riesman, Democracy and Defamatio." Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727
(1942). Riesman's conclusion was as follows:
In the more or less democratic lands, however, the threat of fascism and the chief dangers to freedom of discussion do not spring from the "state", but from "private" fascist
groups in the community. These groups try to repress criticism of themselves, sometimes
with the help of government, but more often and more subtly by "private" pressure and
coercion. This pressure often takes the form of defamation against opposing weaker
groups like "labor", which further weakens these groups in the eyes of the community as
a whole-and even in their own eyes. Or the defamation aims to shift to relatively powerless scapegoats-Negroes, Jews, Mexicans-the attacks which might otherwise be

made against the prevailing system. Usually, both strategies are combined. In this state
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that defamation creates racial stereotypes that injure minority
groups. 0 3 Like Bickel, he believes that some forms of speech constitute
assaults as serious as physical assaults. One example he gives is an
intimidating (but nonviolent) crowd surrounding the home of the first
blacks to move into a white neighborhood.' 4 In his view, governments
are morally obligated to protect their citizens from such conduct. "No
government that would call itself a decent government would fail to
105
...
intervene in these cases.
Having considered the opposing views, we return to Justice
Harlan. How well do his arguments stand up to Bickel and Arkes in
the context of the Skokie cases? Harlan makes, in essence, two arguments for tolerance. The first is that banning offensive methods of expression is undesirable in itself. When symbols such as the swastika or
four-letter words are banned, the speaker's ability to express his emo6
tions and even his ideas is undesirably limited.' 0 Further, banning
such speech is inappropriate because the decision to regulate must be
based on subjective judgment; "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric."107

Second, even if offensive speech is not to be protected for its

own sake, it must be protected as a necessary side effect of our basic
decision to leave control of discourse in the hands of the people rather
than the government. 10 8 In view of the difficulty of line drawing, we
of affairs, it is no longer tenable to continue a negative policy of protection from the
state; such a policy, in concrete situations, plays directly into the hands of the groups
whom supporters of democracy need most to fear.
Id. at 779-80. Professor Kalven referred to this as a "brilliant but erroneous prediction about the
coming problem of a Fascist exploitation of the American Law of defamation." H. KALVEN,
supra note 101, at 233 n.304. On the other hand, the drafters of the Model Penal Code believed
that group libel can indeed be "an important instrument in the subversion of democracy." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 250.7, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). Note that the Chief Reporter of the
Code was Herbert Wechsler.
103. Arkes 292.
104. Id. 309. For a similar expression of the verbal assault idea, see Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,
408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. Arkes 310. See also id. 311. It has been argued that Alexander Meiklejohn would have
taken the same position in connection with the Skokie cases. Jones, Alexander Meiklejohn on
Skokie, 35 GUILD PRAc. 84, 90-91 (1978). This view finds some support in Meiklejohn's comments on civility in public discourse:
And, if the interests of a self-governing society are to be served, vituperation which fixes
attention on the defects of an opponent's character or intelligence and thereby distracts
attention from the question of policy under discussion may be forbidden as a deadly
enemy of peaceable assembly. Anyone who persists in it should be expelled from the
meeting, and, if need be, the police should give help in getting it done.
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment isan Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 260.
106. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 26.
107. Id. at 25.
108. To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only
verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the
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cannot afford to open the door to censorship.
As applied to the Nazi march in Skokie, Harlan's first line of argument seems misplaced. While one man's vulgarity may be another
man's lyricism, this kind of relativism is misguided when applied to the
swastika. Rejecting the swastika is not on the same level of subjective
taste as disliking garlic, if one has the slightest belief in the existence of
moral standards. Perhaps banning the swastika limits expression of an
idea. Bickel is surely right, however, that there is no affirmative societal interest in encouraging the uninhibited propogation of that idea. He
is surely also right that genocide is not an issue on which we are prepared to abide by the results of a referendum. While the first amendment may give some protection to the expression of emotion, a person's
desire to express vicious racial prejudices deserves no solicitude on our
part. If this speech is to be protected, in short, the reason cannot be our
concern that the Nazis might lose the opportunity to impart their
message and convert new disciples.
Justice Harlan is on stronger ground in arguing that this speech,
although worthless, must be tolerated because of the risks created by
suppression. An attempt to purge public discourse of everything offensive and obnoxious undoubtedly would drastically impair the "robust
and uninhibited" public debate we value. 0 9 There is also force in
Harlan's argument that it is risky to make any exceptions on this point,
lest there be no principled stopping place. Finally, he is, one hopes,
justified in his faith that our society is strong enough to shrug off the
side effects of allowing even the most debased messages their place in
the market.
Perhaps Harlan's argument is all the justification for tolerance we
should require. Yet somehow it does not fully satisfy. It is true that if
we began to make exceptions for especially horrible speech we would
have to draw the line somewhere. Still, much of the law consists of
rough but workable line drawing. In this situation, the line could be
drawn generously enough to allow speech with any conceivable merit.
Justice Harlan may be right that the risk, albeit small, is just not worth
taking, but this is a rather negative reason for protecting speech. It
rejects the practicability, but not the desirability, of suppression. To
permit speech we detest would be more palatable if we believed that
doing so served some positive purpose, rather than simply the negative
process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with

verbal cacophony is, in this sense, not a sign of weakness but of strength.
Id. at 24-25.
109. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
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one of preventing the slightest leak in the first amendment dike.
Part of Professor Arkes' argument for suppressing truly offensive
speech inadvertently suggests a positive reason for permitting it. In the
course of discussing the "group libel" case of Beauharnaisv. Illinois,"1 0
Professor Arkes contrasts the vicious racial slurs involved in that case
with Dr. Jenson's heavily qualified, scholarly writing on racial inferiority, writing Arkes clearly would not attempt to ban."' Would it be
desirable as a matter of policy to limit expression of belief in racial
inferiority to respectable scholarly discussions, assuming of course that
all other speech was left entirely unaffected? There is at the outset
something reassuring and attractive about the notion of limiting discussion of such ideas to the pleasant, civilized atmosphere we associate
with academia, while ridding ourselves of crude, vehement expressions
of racism. Yet on closer examination there is also something seriously
wrong with this idea. Limiting expression of racist views to the calm,
heavily qualified statements of scholars would give a completely misleading view of racist thinking. The truth is that racism in our society
is far more often characterized by the ugliest of emotions. If many of
its expressions are ugly, that is because the attitudes behind those expressions are ugly. The most obnoxious expressions of racism confront
us with the offensiveness of the speakers and their ideas. We obtain an
important truth from these speakers, although it is not a truth they
mean to convey.
In the Skokie cases, if we take away the swastika, we take away the
most vivid reminder of just how offensive the Nazis are. We need to be
reminded of the consequences of their kinds of "ideas." We also need
to be reminded that the Nazis are not just another group of harmless
cranks: their views have a deadly potential that we must not be allowed to forget. In short, as in the case of racist invective, to reduce the
ugliness of the Nazis' speech would only conceal the real ugliness, the
ugliness of their ideas. That truth is too important to suppress merely
110. 343 U.S. 250 (1950). Beauharnaisis discussed in notes 17 & 101 supra.
111. Because of the pivotal importance of this passage, full quotation seems appropriate:
The comparison, however, is not fully satisfying. There are important differences that
are not to be discounted in the way the material is treated in the hands of a scholar and
the way it is used by a Beauharnais. Scholars may vary widely in their degree of schol-

arly care, but they are almost universally cautious about qualifying their remarks, and if
for no better motive than to guard themselves against obvious criticism, they can usually
be depended on to say something about the limits of generality in the analyses they are
offering. With the material involved in Beauharnais,a scholar would be likely to have
warned that the data he was reporting about blacks described the characteristics of an
aggregate; that it was hazardous to draw inferences about individuals from the statistical
profile of a population; and that there was of course some overlap among populations, so
that there were classes of whites who had higher crime rates than blacks as a group, and
many blacks who had never been implicated in a crime.
Arkes 300.
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to maintain our mental equanimity.
What of Cohen v. California? For the militarist, perhaps Cohen

stands on all fours with the Skokie cases. To allow Cohen to use offensive language reinforces the offensiveness of his views. It also reveals
the link between those views and rebellion against other American
norms. For the rest of us, Cohen's message was within the bounds of
the legitimately thinkable, and his use of strong language accurately
reflected his views. After all, few things are more offensive than an
112
unjust war.
In short, offensiveness is often an important part of the speaker's
message. Use of offensive language reveals the existence of something
offensive and ugly, whether in the situation described by the speaker or
in the speaker's mind itself. In either event, the language reveals an
important though unpleasant truth about the world. Suppressing this
language violates a cardinal principle of a free society, that truths are
better confronted than repressed. As long as we live in an ugly world,
ugly speech must have its forum. 113 We cannot expect to have, nor
should we require, true civility in discourse until we achieve civility in
society.
112. In Cohen, there may be an additional reason for permitting the speech. In a democracy,
given the government's lack of any power to coerce respect from its citizens, see Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969), there may be a special privilege to use abusive, offensive language
with respect to the government. See generally Coulton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 122 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In this respect, offensive speech like that used in Cohen is like seditious
libel, but is the converse of group libel. As Riesman has noted, in many ways, group libel is the
reverse image ofseditious libel. What would be seditious libel if directed against those in power is
group libel when directed against powerless minorities. See Riesman, supra note 102, at 734-39,
779-80. See also H. KALVEN, supra note 101, at 1-64 (linking group libel and seditious libel).
113. This phrasing is chosen deliberately. Speech of this kind must have a forum in which it
can be presented. It does not necessarily follow that every forum should be open to such speech, if
there are reasons for exclusion such as captive audience problems. Thus, this analysis does not
require that courts void context-related bans such as that in Pacoca.
There is a further reason why this analysis does not apply to Pacixfca. In Pac/ifca, to the
extent that the offensive speech was "about" anything, it was about the undesirability of the Federal Communications Commission ban of indecent speech. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d
9, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd,438 U.S. 726 (1978). On the theory explained in the text, it might be
argued that this speech served the useful function of confronting the audience with the potential
offensiveness of the speaker's point of view concerning the right to use indecent language. But if
we assume that the broadcast was protected, the audience cannot do anything about the issue
anyway. If people are repelled by the Nazis, they can oppose their program. If people are repelled by the monologue in Pacoca, there is nothing for them to oppose but re-broadcasting the
monologue itself. Because of this element of circularity, the analysis presented in the text is inapplicable to the situation presented in PacMca. The necessary premise is that the offensiveness of
the speech reveal something about some other issue, not simply about the speech itself as in
Pacfica.
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III.

CONCLUSION

Justice Harlan narrowed the issues in Cohen to a single question:
whether the state has the power to upgrade public discourse by banning
offensive speech. He concluded that this power is lacking, a conclusion
easy enough to accept in Cohen, but more difficult in cases like Village
of Skokie and Collin, where the speech is more offensive and more
clearly worthless. In this context, Professor Bickel's arguments become
harder to refute. Yet there is much to be said for Harlan's counterargument that the benefits to be gained outweigh the risks created by even
the most limited censorship.
The last portion of this Essay has attempted to bolster Harlan's
argument with an additional rationale, that the most highly offensive
forms of expression communicate an important truth about the offensiveness of the speaker's message. They have a place in the marketplace of ideas because they help the marketplace reject false, ugly ideas
by revealing them for what they are. Acceptance of this rationale depends, of course, on a basic confidence in the ability of the people to
understand and to act upon what they read and hear. It is this confidence in the American people that Justice Harlan so eloquently expressed in his Cohen opinion.
This Essay has stressed throughout the limits on the holding in
Cohen. While Cohen says that offensive speech may not be banned
outright, it says little about when such speech can be banned in particular contexts. It offers only limited guidance for determining to what
extent government can protect people from involuntary exposure to offensive forms of expression. It does not even assure us that Paul Cohen
was entitled to wear his jacket in the courthouse corridor. It does, however, establish one very important principle: the government is not entitled to assume the role of moral guardian and to set the standards of
acceptable discourse. 114 Establishment of that principle is an enduring
contribution to our legal heritage.

114. Another way of stating the Cohen holding is that the government is not entitled to jail
people as part of an educational program to improve their vocabularies. Even without the first
amendment, the Court might find a way to void such perverse legislation. See generally Carey v.
Population Control Servs., 431 U.S. 678, 713-16 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (citing Cohen

for the proposition that public intolerance of eccentric behavior cannot justify incarceration).

